There are many situations in which buyers have a significant stake in what a firm learns about their demands. Specifically, any time that price discrimination is possible on an individual bases and repeat purchases are likely, buyers possess incentives for strategic manipulation of demand information.
Introduction
In a classic paper, Rothschild (1974) showed that the pricing problem facing a monopolist with unknown demand is often analogous to a two-armed bandit problem. 1 Hence, the optimal policy for such a firm is to experiment with prices in order to learn about its unknown demand parameters. It is, however, well-known that the optimal policy may not result in complete learning because of the opportunity cost of experimentation. In addition, the learning process may be severely hampered unless the firm possesses significant prior knowledge about the type of uncertainty confronting it. For instance, even when demand is deterministic, Aghion, Bolton, Harris, and Jullien (1991) show that strong conditions such as continuity and quasi-concavity of the profit function are required to guarantee that a monopoly will eventually learn all the relevant information.
In this paper, a very different -but important -caveat is added to the list of reasons that a monopolist may have difficulty learning its demand. The firm may serve customers who do not want their demand characteristics to be known! In the prior literature on price experimentation, the possibility of strategic buyers has been largely ignored. 2 Specifically, it has typically been assumed either that the monopolist faces a sequence of identical customers who exist in the market for only one period or that market demand is composed of a large number of small customers. 3 There are, however, many real-world situations in which buyers have a significant stake in what a firm learns about their demands. Specifically, any time that price discrimination is possible on an individual bases and repeat purchases are likely, buyers possess incentives for strategic manipulation of demand information. In any longterm supply relationship, the buyer wants the supplier to think that he has very elastic demand for the product, and the buyer may even strategically reject some price offers in order to manipulate the suppliers beliefs to this end.
In this paper, a simple two-period experimental pricing and learning environment is analyzed. Specifically, there is assumed to be a single buyer whose underlying demand parameter, λ, is private information. The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer in the first period and updates her belief about the value of λ based on the buyer's acceptance decision. In particular, acceptance (rejection) of a high first-period price implies that the buyer's first-period valuation was high (low). This leads the seller to update her beliefs about λ and, therefore, to infer that the buyer's second-period valuation for her product is also likely to be high (low). Indeed, it is shown that if the buyer is myopic, then the informational value of a high first-period price can lead the seller to charge one when it would otherwise not be optimal to do so.
Things are very different, however, if the buyer is as patient as the seller. In this case, it is shown that if the buyer's first-period valuation is high, then he will often attempt to conceal information by strategically rejecting high first-period offers. In fact, a buyer with a high value of λ stands to gain the most from concealing his high first-period valuation. This gives rise to 'reverse screening' at high prices in the sense that only buyers with low values of λ (and high valuations) will accept high first-period prices. When the first-period price is low, however, two types of continuation equilibria emerge, a Good equilibrium (for the seller) in which all buyer types purchase the product and a Bad equilibrium in which a buyer with a relatively high value of λ but low valuation for the 1 Many authors have subsequently refined and extended this observation. See, for example, Aghion, Bolton, Harris, and Jullien (1991) ; Mirman, Samuelson, and Urbano (1993) ; Rustichini and Wolinsky (1995) ; Keller and Rady (1999) .
2 An exception is Kennan (2000) who shows that persistent private information may lead to stochastic cycles in repeated labor negotiations.
3 In a related paper, Segal (2002) considers a setting in which there is a finite number of buyers in the market from the outset. He shows that if the common distribution of buyers' valuations is unknown, then learning through price experimentation is dominated by a multi-unit auction which sets a price to each buyer on the basis of the demand distribution inferred statistically from other buyers' bids.
product may strategically reject an offer to signal his low valuation to the seller. This signaling behavior at low prices is the mirror image of the screening that occurs at high prices. Hence, strategic rejections at high prices conceal information while strategic rejections at low prices reveal information.
Since all of the continuation equilibria involve a lower effective first-period demand relative to the myopic buyer case, the seller generally finds it optimal to set a lower price when confronted with a strategic buyer. In fact, she never 'experiments' by charging a high price in order to obtain information. Indeed, the seller often charges first-period prices that reveal no information at all, and she may even set an equilibrium first-period price strictly below the buyer's lowest possible valuation.
The pricing and acceptance behavior exhibited in the model presented here can be viewed as a manifestation of the rachet effect familiar from the regulation and agency literature. 4 Specifically, the inability of the firm to commit not to use the information it learns in the first period harms it if the buyer is relatively patient. The strategic rejections associated with patient buyers often result in both a lower first-period equilibrium price and a lower probability of sale than would prevail if the firm could commit to price non-contingently.
This paper also contributes to the burgeoning literature on behavior-based price discrimination. 5 In Internet retailing as well as many other market settings, firms now have the ability to track the purchasing behavior of individual customers and to tailor price offers to them. 6 To the extent that consumers are aware of this, the findings presented here indicate that they possess significant incentives to manipulate the information collected. Hence, it will typically be necessary for firms to offer their customers valuable benefits in order to induce them to reveal their private information.
The basic model is presented in the next section. In Section 3, the bench-mark setting in which the buyer is not strategic is characterized. The analysis at the core of the paper is presented in Section 4, where the first-period expected demand of a strategic buyer is derived. Sections 5 and 6 deal respectively with the best and worst equilibria for the seller and contain most of the economic results. Some brief concluding remarks appear in Section 7. Proofs not appearing in the text have been relegated to the Appendix.
The Model
There are two risk-neutral players, a seller (S, she) and a buyer (B, he), who possess respective discount factors δ ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1]. In each period, t = 1, 2, B demands one unit of a good which S may produce and sell to him. S's production cost is normalized to zero. B's valuation for the good in period t, v t , is high, v H , with probability λ and low, v L , with probability 1 − λ, v H > v L ≥ 0. In other words, B's valuations are independent draws from a two-point distribution with parameter λ.
The demand parameter λ, is itself the realization of a random variable which is continuously distributed on [0, 1] with probability density function f (λ). (For instance, λ might represent B's income and f (λ) the distribution of income in the population of potential buyers.) Let E[λ] denote its expected value under the prior. Also, it is notationally convenient to define the constant
4 See, for example, Laffont and Tirole (1988) , and especially Hart and Tirole (1988) . 5 See, for example, Acquisti and Varian (2002) , Taylor (2002) , Shaffer and Zhang (2000) , Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) , and Villas Boas (1999) .
6 See Krugman (2000) and Streitfield (2000) .
At the beginning of the game, B privately observes λ and v 1 , and he privately observes v 2 at the beginning of the second period. Hence, in any given period, B's 'type' has two components, his permanent 'long-run' type λ ∈ [0, 1] and his transitory 'short-run' type v t ∈ {v L , v H }. 7 In each period t = 1, 2, B and S play an extensive-form game with the following stages.
B observes his valuation
2. S announces price p t ∈ + at which she is willing to sell the good to B.
3. B either accepts (q t = 1) or rejects (q t = 0) S's offer.
4. B's (contemporaneous) payoff is q t (v t − p t ), and S's payoff is q t p t .
Note that while this game has a recursive structure, it is not a repeated game due to the presence of asymmetric information. Specifically, S updates her prior beliefs about λ from the first period to the second.
In particular, let h S ≡ (p 1 , q 1 ) be the history of first-period events observed by S, and let h B ≡ (λ, v 1 , p 1 , q 1 ) be the history of first-period events observed by B at the beginning of period 2. A behavior strategy for S is a pair of probability distributions, (Φ 1 (p 1 ), Φ 2 (p 2 ; h S )), over all possible price offers. Similarly, a behavior strategy for B is a pair of functions, (
where γ t is the probability that B accepts S's offer in period t.
Let f (λ|h S ) denote S's posterior beliefs about λ at the beginning of period 2. Likewise, let E[λ|h S ] denote her updated expectation. The solution concept employed is efficient perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE); i.e., a PBE in which indifference about pricing or purchasing is resolved in favor of efficiency. (Since inefficient PBEs occur only for a non-generic set of parameter values, the 'efficient' qualifier is suppressed below.)
Observe that in the second period, B optimally accepts any price that does not exceed his valuation regardless of the history. Given this, S believes the good will be sold for price p 2 with probability
This is S's expectation of B's second-period demand for her product. Hence, S may either price at v H and sell with probability E[λ|h S ], or she can price at v L and sell with probability one. Thus, S optimally sets
This serves as proof of the following proposition that gives necessary conditions on second-period equilibrium strategies.
Proposition 1 (Second-Period Equilibrium Behavior) In any PBE, B's strategy in period 2 is
S offers p 2 = v L with probability θ(h S ) and p 2 = v H with probability 1 − θ(h S ) according to
The central concern of the next two sections is the first-period equilibrium behavior.
7 While B's type is multi-dimentional, the focus here is on pricing without commitment rather than on the optimal monopolistic screening mechanism (e.g., Armstron (1996) and Rochet and Chone (1998) ).
Myopic Buyer
In this section the setting in which B completely discounts the future (i.e., β = 0) is analyzed. There are two possible interpretations for this bench mark. First, it might occur because B is unaware that S is tracking his purchasing history in order to learn about his preferences. Second, B may actually consist of two stochastically equivalent (i.e., λ is the same), but distinct buyers, B 1 and B 2 , who arrive sequentially at S's store. In this case, S learns about the preferences of B 2 by observing the purchasing behavior of B 1 . Under either interpretation, B acts myopically in the first period.
Denote by E L the expected value of λ given B's first-period valuation was v L , and let E H be the expected value of λ given v 1 = v H . Straightforward calculations yield
and
Observe that 
The intuition behind this result is easily grasped. First, β = 0 means that B treats each period as a one-shot game in which he accepts any offer yielding him a non-negative payoff. From S's prospective, the probability B accepts an offer of p 1 in the first period is
Second, note that charging p 1 = v L provides no information about B's second-period demand because he always accepts this offer. Pricing at p 1 = v H , however, does reveal information because B accepts the high price if and only if v 1 = v H . Hence, the probability that B accepts p 2 conditional on acceptance of
and the probability that B accepts p 2 conditional on rejection of
S finds it optimal to charge v H in both periods if λ * is low enough, and she charges v L in both periods if it is high. In the intermediate range for λ * , S charges p 1 = v H in the first period, p 2 = v H following acceptance and p 2 = v L following rejection in the second period.
The region where S prices contingently is
she is willing to run a significant risk of losing a first-period sale (her expected first-period payoff is higher under p 1 = v L ) in order to obtain valuable information about B's demand parameter, λ.
Corresponding to the notion that the value of information gained through pricing at p 1 = v H increases as S becomes more patient, λ is an increasing function of δ:
When δ = 0 (S completely discounts the future), the experimentation region disappears altogether. In order to focus on settings where information is potentially valuable to S, the following necessary condition is assumed to hold throughout the remainder of the paper:
If this fails to hold, then S is either so pessimistic (
In either case, learning v 1 has no value to her. Corollary 1 (below) compares the setting in which B is myopic with a setting where S can publicly commit to not use any information she learns in period 1. When S can commit to price non-contingently, B optimally accepts p t ≤ v t in period t = 1, 2, and equilibrium prices are given by: Attention now turns to situations in which β > 0 and B, therefore, has strategic considerations regarding the revelation of his private information.
Strategic Buyer
Now, suppose β > 0 and that S offers p 1 in the first period. By Proposition 1, the expected payoff of B with first-period valuation v 1 and long-run type λ is
if he accepts p 1 , and
if he rejects p 1 . This simple observation serves as proof of the following claim.
Lemma 1 (Dynamic Incentives) Suppose β > 0. In any PBE, B accepts p 1 if and only if
In any PBE, it must be the case that E[λ|p 1 , q 1 ] is derived from B's first-period behavior given θ(p 1 , q 1 ), and θ(p 1 , q 1 ) is optimal for S given E[λ|p 1 , q 1 ]. This interdependence between optimal actions and beliefs is the key to the next important result.
Lemma 2 (Beliefs and Actions
Intuitively, since B is more likely to accept when v 1 = v H , S's beliefs about λ should be higher when she observes q 1 = 1 than when she observes q 1 = 0. Along with Lemma 1, Lemma 2 implies that B never accepts an offer yielding negative first-period surplus.
Corollary 2 (Honest Rejections) Suppose β > 0. In any PBE, B always rejects p 1 > v 1 .
8 To see this, note that λ
Corollary 2 indicates that B never accepts p 1 > v H and that he does not accept
The next step in deriving the equilibrium of the game is to consider B's acceptance decision if 
of B does better rejecting p 1 , which contradicts the supposition.
Second, suppose B with
. In either case, B does better accepting p 1 , which contradicts the supposition.
Summarizing the above, when p 1 ∈ (p, v H ), B's purchasing decision must be based not only on his first-period valuation, but also on his long-run type λ. Determining when B with v 1 = v H accepts p 1 ∈ (p, v H ) requires some additional notation and machinery. To start with, for any µ ∈ [0, 1], define the functions
These functions have some important properties which are summarized in the following technical lemma.
Lemma 3 (Geometric Properties of α and ρ) Functions α and ρ possess the following properties:
(i) α starts at α(0) = 0 and increases monotonicly until it ends at α(1) = E H .
(ii) ρ starts at ρ(0) = E[λ], increases until it crosses the 45-degree line, and then decreases until it ends at
(iii) α and ρ cross once, and at their intersection,
These functions are interpreted as follows. Suppose that B accepts some price p 1 if and only if v 1 = v H and λ ≤ µ. Then, α(µ) is the expected value of λ conditional on acceptance, and ρ(µ) is the expected value of λ conditional on rejection.
Lemma 3 implies that there exists a unique number m ∈ [m min , 1) defined as follows: In Figure 1 , m is shown for the case
Observe that µ(p 1 ) is monotone decreasing with µ(p) = 1 and µ(p) = m.
Lemma 4 (Strategic Rejections) Suppose β > 0 and v 1 = v H . In any PBE, the following must hold: 
.
. 
Notice that 'reverse screening' occurs over this range in the sense that high prices induce rejection by high types. Indeed, as p 1 increases, the 'marginal' long-run type, µ(p 1 ), falls and the set of long-run types willing to strategically reject increases. Acceptance and rejection, therefore, become less informative. Once p 1 = p, further increases in p 1 cannot induce more strategic rejection.
In The following result is proved by applying Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
Corollary 3 (Honest Acceptances) Suppose β > 0. In any PBE, B with
Lemma 5 establishes some important geometric properties ofα andρ. These functions are interpreted as follows. Suppose that B rejects some price p 1 if and only if v 1 = v L and λ >μ. Then,α(μ) is the expected value of λ conditional on acceptance, andρ(μ) is the expected value of λ conditional on rejection.
Lemma 5 implies that there exists a unique numberm ∈ (0,m max ] defined as follows:
In Figure 2 ,m is shown for the case
Observe thatμ(p 1 ) is monotone decreasing withμ(p) =m andμ(v L ) = 0. Corollary 3 indicates that B with v 1 = v H always accepts p 1 ≤ v L . However, it is silent about B's purchasing decision when v 1 = v L .
Lemma 6 (The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly) Suppose β > 0 and
There is also a Bad PBE in which the following holds: Notice that as p 1 falls,μ(p 1 ) increases and the set of long-run types willing to strategically reject shrinks. Acceptance and rejection, thus, provide weaker information about λ. For prices p 1 ≤p, signaling is not possible and Lemma 6 shows that any such price must induce acceptance by all types in any PBE.
With Lemmas 1 through 6 in hand, it is now possible to calculate the expected first-period demand (which is depicted in Figure 3 , and the expected values of λ conditional on acceptance and rejection of the first-period price.
Proposition 3 (Expected First-Period Demand and Posterior Beliefs) Suppose β > 0. Then, the expected probability that B accepts p 1 and the expected values of λ conditional on acceptance and rejection of p 1 are as follows: 
if q 1 = 1 and p 1 ≤p. Given the above, S's expected payoff is
The final step in deriving the players' equilibrium behavior is to determine the value of p 1 that maximizes Π S (p 1 ). Of course, the solution to this problem depends on whether the Good or the Bad PBE obtains. These cases are investigated respectively in the next two sections.
The Good Equilibrium
In this section, the Good PBE in which B always accepts p 1 ≤ v L is explored. For any µ ∈ [0, 1], it is notationally convenient to define
First, suppose S offers p 1 ∈ [p, v H ], then her expected payoff can be written as 
The information conveyed by B's purchasing decision is valuable to S. In the second period, she optimally sets p 2 = v H following acceptance and
The value of information is maximal, as no strategic rejections occur over this range of prices. Obviously, S's expected payoff over
Observe that S's expected payoff is maximized at p 1 = v L in this case. Summarizing the above, in equilibrium S charges some
, depending on the parameters of the model, λ * , β, δ and f (λ). The following result establishes that if S's prior beliefs are 'pessimistic', λ * ≥ E [λ] , and B is at least as patient as S, then S charges v L in both periods.
Proposition 4 (Optimal Prices with a Patient Buyer and Pessimistic Beliefs
Recall from Proposition 2 that when β = 0, it is optimal for S to experiment by charging
When β > 0, S must either pay B high information rent (set p 1 = p), or run the risk that he will strategically reject her offer (marginal type, µ(p 1 ), falls as p 1 goes from p to p).
For any p 1 ∈ [p, p), Proposition 4 shows that as β approaches δ, the information rent dominates the value of the information obtained through experimentation, and S, therefore, opts not to experiment. In addition, since S learns nothing by setting p 1 = v L in the Good PBE, she also sets p 2 = v L . This, of course, maximizes welfare because B buys the good in both periods with probability one.
When λ * < E[λ] ('optimistic' beliefs), the story is somewhat more complicated. The following result shows that in this case, S also has incentives to select a price that generates no valuable information.
Proposition 5 (Optimal Prices with a Patient Buyer and Optimistic Beliefs
The story behind this result is similar to the previous one. When B is as patient as S, the information rent S must pay outweighs the value of information she obtains. Hence, S prefers prices that obtain information that has zero value. In the Good PBE, there are two potentially optimal prices for which this is true, Comparing Corollaries 1 and 4 reveals some striking welfare reversals. Specifically, when B is myopic, B is always (weakly) worse off and S is always (weakly) better off under the ContingentPrice setting. Moreover, experimental pricing reduces welfare because the value of the information obtained by S is outweighed by the social cost of experimentation. By contrast, when B is relatively patient, B is always (weakly) worse off and S is always (weakly) better off under the Fixed-Price setting.
The reason for this reversal is clear. When β ≥ δ, B aggressively protects his private information by rejecting offers that do not provide him with sufficient information rent. In this case, the direct cost of acquiring information typically outweighs its value to S. Hence, when β ≥ δ and λ * ≥ E[λ], S sets p 1 = v L and learns nothing about B's preferences. This is, of course, the same outcome as in the Fixed-Price setting. Now, suppose λ * < E [λ] . In the Fixed-Price setting, S sets p 1 = v H . Since S cannot use information obtained, B demands no information rent, and he, therefore, accepts this offer with expected probability E [λ] . In the Contingent-Price setting, however, S cannot commit not to use information, and she must either lower the price price or face a substantially lower expected probability of sale. In either case, S is worse off and B is weakly better off as compared with the Fixed-Price setting. It is not surprising that the Contingent-Price setting generates lower welfare than the Fixed-Price one when λ * is close to E L . Indeed, the prices are the same under the two settings,
Corollary 4 raises the question how S might commit not to learn about B's preferences or not to use any information she learns. First, it seems unlikely that S could commit not to learn because such a commitment is difficult (if not impossible) to verify. Second, while it seems plausible that S could commit not to raise prices, a commitment not to lower them is not renegotiation proof. Note, however, that it is the commitment not to lower prices that has strategic value to S.
If S is actually composed of two sellers, S 1 and S 2 , selling distinct but related products, then it might be possible for S 1 to commit not to share information with S 2 . This commitment may, however, still be difficult for B to verify. In other words, strategic rejections by B and the concomitant inefficiency may be difficult for S to eliminate through commitment.
The Bad Equilibrium
In this section, the Bad PBE described in Lemma 6 is investigated. For anyμ ∈ [0, 1] it is convenient to defineÎ
First, suppose S offers p 1 ∈ (p, v L ], then S's expected payoff can be written as
Second, suppose S offers p 1 ≤p, then S's expected payoff can be written as
Obviously, p 1 =p dominates any p 1 <p. Summarizing the above, in equilibrium S charges some
, depending on the parameters of the model. The following result establishes that the Bad PBE is really bad. That is, worse for S than the Good PBE.
Proposition 6 (The Bad PBE v.s. the Good PBE) The expected payoff to S is (weakly) higher in the Good PBE than in the Bad one.
This result is easily understood. If the Bad PBE involves a first-period price of p 1 > v L , then S can get the same payoff in the Good PBE by adopting the same strategy. If the Bad PBE involves p 1 ∈ (p, v L ], then the probability of a first-period sale is so low relative to the Good PBE that it outweighes the value of the information obtained in the Bad PBE.
Combining Corollary 4 and Proposition 6 yields the following result. Corollary 4 indicates that if the Good PBE obtains, the Contingent-Price setting is as good for S as the Fixed-Price one if λ * ≥ E [λ] . In this range for parameter λ * , S's expected payoff from charging any p 1 ∈ (p, v L ] in the Bad PBE is strictly lower than her expected equilibrium payoff in the Good PBE. Thus, S strictly prefers the Fixed-Price setting.
If λ * < E [λ] , S prefers the Fixed-Price setting to the Contingent-Price setting when the Good PBE obtains, and, thus, when the Bad PBE obtains. Hence, she is strictly worse off under the Contingent-Price setting when the Bad PBE obtains relative to the Fixed-Price setting for all values of parameter λ * .
The final result in this section demonstrates that the Bad PBE is not necessarily bad for B. In particular, in order to preempt signaling by B, S may find it optimal to induce complete pooling by setting a price lower than v L . The intuition here is easily understood. When λ * is close to E H , the value of any information S can obtain is small. Also,p is close to v L in this case (becausem is small). S, therefore, preferrs to sell atp with certainty rather than at a slightly higher price with much lower probability.
Conclusion
This paper was concerned with learning from a strategic agent in the context of monopoly pricing. Two settings were analyzed: the Contingent-Price setting, where the monopolist learns information about a demand parameter of a specific customer and uses this information to tailor future offers to him, and the Fixed-Price setting, where the monopolist publicly commits to price non-contingently.
It was shown that the buyer fared poorly and the firm well under the Contingent-Price setting when the buyer was myopic. Indeed, the opportunity to price contingently can give the firm an incentive to charge a high 'experimental' price in the first period. Such experimentation unambiguously lowers welfare because the value of information obtained by the firm is outweighed by the loss in expected consumer surplus.
When the buyer is non-myopic, he may strategically reject the firm's first-period offers for one of two reasons. First, in order to conceal information (i.e., to pool), a high-valuation buyer may reject high prices that would never be accepted by a low-valuation buyer. Second, in order to reveal information (i.e., to signal), a low-valuation buyer may reject low prices that would always be accepted by a high-value buyer. Given these strategic reactions, the firm often finds it optimal to post prices that generate no useful information. It was shown that the firm did better committing to price non-contingently when the buyer was farsighted. Lacking this commitment, the buyer possessed strong incentives to manipulate the information acquired by the firm, and this manipulation typically results in either low prices or low sales or both. In short, the ability of a monopolist to learn about the demand characteristics of a strategic consumer through experimental pricing appears to be very limitted.
1. If p 1 > v H , then B always rejects the first-period offer. D 1 (p 1 ) = 0 in this case.
which contradicts the supposition.
3. If p 1 ≤ v L , then always B accepts the first-period offer. D 1 (p 1 ) = 1 in this case.
Step 2. By way of contradiction, suppose θ(p 1 , 1) > θ(p 1 , 0). Then Lemma 1 implies the following:
(If calculated λ ≥ 1, then B always rejects the first-period offer, 0] . This along with Proposition 1 implies that θ(p 1 , 1) = 0 ≤ θ(p 1 , 0) must hold, which contradicts the supposition.
. 0] . This along with Proposition 1 implies that θ(p 1 , 1) ≤ θ(p 1 , 0) = 1 must hold, which contradicts the supposition.
3. If p 1 ≤ v L , then B always accepts the first-period offer. D 1 (p 1 ) = 1 in this case.
Step 3. Proof of Lemma 3: Each part is proven in turn.
This is positive for µ > 0.
(ii) Differentiating ρ gives
This is positive for sufficiently small µ > 0. Hence, ρ is initially increasing. Moreover, setting the above expression equal to zero establishes that ρ has a unique critical point where it crosses the 45-degree line. Hence, ρ is increasing up to this point and decreasing thereafter. 
It then follows from Proposition 1 that setting θ(p 1 , 0) = 1 and θ(p 1 , 1) = 0 is optimal. By Lemma 1, B accepts 
2
Proof of Lemma 5: Each part is proven in turn.
This is negative for smallμ > 0. Hence,α is initially decreasing. Moreover, setting the above expression equal to zero establishes thatα has a unique critical point where it crosses the 45-degree line. Hence,α is decreasing up to this point and increasing thereafter.
(ii) Differentiatingρ givesρ
This is strictly positive forμ < 1. 
By Lemma 1, B has no incentives to reject p 1 as
It then follows from Proposition 1 that setting θ(p 1 , 1) = 0 and θ(p 1 , 0) = 1 is optimal. By Lemma 1, B accepts p 1 iff
Proof of Proposition 4:
for all µ ∈ (m, 1]. Note that the right side of this inequality is increasing in β. Hence, if it holds for β = δ, then it holds for all β ≥ δ. The condition may, therefore, be recast as
The first two terms of this expression are non-negative. The third term is positive, as
Proof of Proposition 5: Each part is proven in turn.
where
Observe that lim →0 m( ) = m min . Taking the limit of the above inequality as goes to zero gives
Thus, the condition is satisfied for > 0 sufficiently small.
The first two terms of this expression are non-negative. The third term is positive (see the proof of Proposition 4). The forth term is positive for > 0 sufficiently small.
(ii) Let λ * ≡ E L + ξ for some ξ > 0. First, offering
Plugging in for λ * ≡ E L + ξ gives
Observe that lim ξ→0 m(ξ) = 1. Taking the limit of the above inequality as ξ goes to zero gives
Thus, the condition is satisfied for ξ > 0 sufficiently small.
Second, offering p
Observe that as ξ goes to zero, interval (m, 1] shrinks to {1}. Thus, if the above condition holds strictly at the limit as µ goes to 1, then it holds for all µ ∈ (m, 1] when ξ is sufficiently small. Taking the limit as µ goes to 1 gives 
Second, suppose S offers p 1 ∈ (p, v L ]. It must be shown that
for allμ ∈ (0,m]. If this holds for all δ ≤ 1, then it holds for δ = 1. The condition may, therefore, be recast as
The first term is non-negative, the second term is also non-negative, as 
Obviously, both terms of the left side of the condition are non-negative. 
for allμ ∈ (0,m]. Note that if the condition holds for all δ ≤ 1, then it holds for δ = 1. The condition may, therefore, be recast as
Taking the limit as ψ goes to zero gives
Thus, the condition is satisfied for ψ > 0 sufficiently small. Second, offering p 1 =p dominates all
for all µ ∈ (m, 1]. Note that if the condition holds for all δ ≤ 1, then it holds for δ = 1. The condition may, therefore, be recast as
−βE[λ](1 − E H ) + E[λ]E H < E H .
Thus, the condition is satisfied for ψ > 0 sufficiently small. Finally, offering p 1 =p dominates
Thus, the condition is satisfied for ψ > 0 sufficiently small. 2
